Certain tasks, such as formal program development and theorem proving, fundamentally rely upon the manipulation of higher-order objects such as functions and predicates. Computing tools intended to assist in performing these tasks are at present inadequate in both the amount of 'knowledge' they contain (i.e., the level of support they provide) and in their ability to 'learn' (i.e., their capacity to enhance that support over time). The application of a relevant machine learning technique-explanation-based generalization (EBG)-has thus far been limited to first-order problem representations. We extend EBG to generalize higher-order values, thereby enabling its application to higher-order problem encodings.
Introduction
Certain tasks, such as program development and theorem proving, fundamentally rely upon the manipulation of higher-order objects such as functions and predicates. To enhance the support computing tools can provide for such complex domains, it will be necessary to increase considerably the 'knowledge' represented in those tools. Successfully coding all this knowledge a priori is impossible due to the scope, complexity, and evolutionary nature of these domains. Rather, tools must support assimilation of problem solving experience. However, simply memorizing (i.e., caching) particular solutions is insufficient; instead experience must be abstracted or generalized. Learning, the ability to generalize and assimilate from experience, will therefore have a significant impact on the success of future tools.
Much of machine learning research may be divided between inductive, or similaritybased learning, and analytical learning. Inductive methods produce a description of a desired
The brevity of this paper requires that we presume some minimal familiarity with Prolog and the simply-typed X-calculus; respective introductions may be found within Sterling and Shapiro (1986) and Hindley and Seldin (1986) .
First-order EBG
We begin by briefly illustrating explanation-based generalization with a first-order example from DeJong and Mooney (1986, pp. 158-166) : (We apologize to any readers offended by the morbidity of this example, but is has become standard in the literature.) EBG divides the theory of the problem domain between a domain theory, which we also denote with D:
<= hate A B, possess A C, weapon C. hate W W <= depressed W. possess U V <= buy U V. weapon Z <= gun Z.
and a training theory or 3:
depressed John, buy John objl. gun obj1.
(Within our examples, constants are in boldface while variables are in italics. As in Prolog ',' denotes conjunction. The symbol <= represents implication, and is equivalent to Prolog's ':-'.) Both D and 3 are composed of XProlog clauses. For readers familiar with EBG, 3 roughly corresponds to training instance; justification for the new terminology is given within §3. The EBG algorithm is additionally provided with a query, or goal, such as ?-kill john john.
EBG then requires a proof that solves the given query. Within our paradigm, such an explanation may be expressed as a trace of XProlog computation. A proof of the above query is illustrated within Figure 1 . Goals of the proof are underlined, while the program clause that reduces a particular goal appears underneath. In the course of applying each clause, its variables may be unified with constants or variables of the goals, resulting in the given unification constraints (enclosed in '<>')• EBG generalizes this explanation to produce an encapsulation of the employed proof strategy. In Figure 2 , a generalized proof is constructed that corresponds to the original, except that clauses of 3 (or 3-clauses) are omitted. This forms EBG's bias in the generalization space: the proof of the given query is generalized by abstracting steps involving clauses of the training theory. At the root of the new proof is a generalized query, which is derived from the original by replacing each of the first-order constants with a variable: the goal kill john john becomes the general goal kill X Y. Clauses of D (or D-clauses) applied in the first proof are correspondingly applied in the second. This restricts the outcome by propagating unification constraints through the proof (e.g., kill X Y becoming kill XX). Leaves of the generalized proof (e.g., gun C) correspond to subgoals of the original proof that were derived from 3. These leaves are accumulated in a conjunction of conditions sufficient to establish the generalized query: kill X X <= depressed X, buy X C, gun C.
We will frequently refer to the resulting proof encapsulation as a derived rule, or as an explanation-based generalization, or simply as a generalization.
Modal logic
Our formulation of EBG relies upon the separation of D and J, since only rules of the former are incorporated within generalized proofs. To differentiate the two, we prefix Dclauses with the D operator, which is borrowed from modal logic-logics in which propositions have multiple levels or modes of truth, such as 'may be' and 'must be.' 1, 2 We illustrate our use of D on the first-order example of §2. D and 3, which constitute the logic program, may now be jointly expressed as The above presentation does not rely upon XProlog's implicit universal quantification of a program's logical variables. This is because our EBG algorithm differentiates between the clauses D Vx. D and Vx. D D. (The motivation for this distinction is beyond the scope of the paper; see Dietzen (1991) .) However, since explicitly specifying quantifiers can become exceedingly tedious, we introduce the '!!' shorthand to represent this universal quantification implicitly. The first clause of 3D may then be expressed as !! kill A B <= hate A B, possess A C, weapon C.
From the query kill john john, the resulting explanation-based generalization becomes !! kill X X <= depressed X, buy X C, gun C.
Traditionally, the modal operator D (sometimes called 'L') precedes necessarily true sentences, or equivalently, those true in 'all possible states' or at 'all times.' Non-prefixed sentences are only contingently true, true in the 'current state' or at the 'current time.' Our incorporation of D is founded upon a correspondence between (1) EBG's separation of domain and training theory and (2) modal logic's separation of necessary and contingent truth: Because the validity of the generalizations derived through EBG depend solely upon 3D, more stringent truth requirements are placed upon D-clauses-namely that they be true in all possible configurations of the problem space being modeled. Clauses of 3, as they are excluded from generalized proofs, can safely be revised or removed without invalidating the derived generalizations (e.g., depressed john becoming false). Such revision could be explained semantically as 'changing states' or 'switching worlds. ' Suppose that within the suicide example, we remove the D from the clause weapon Z <= gun Z. This results in the generalized proof of Figure 3 and the generalization !! kill X X <= depressed X, buy X C, weapon C. The above rule is more general than the previous one, but its application requires more work. This illustrates the trade-off inherent in the partitioning of 3D and J: D-clauses get 'compiled into' the rules derived through EBG, while 3-clauses must be evaluated at the time of application. Now, again within the original example, suppose instead that we replace the last clause with D gun obj1. This has the effect of 'anchoring' the generalization to obj1, with the result of an identical query being the generalized proof of Figure 4 (whose rightmost branch is solved), and the generalization !! kill X X <= depressed X, buy X obj1.
By moving a clause from 3 or 3D, we make the resulting generalization more specific. Such a shift is, however, dangerous in that the generalization then depends upon the validity of D gun obj1. In another configuration where obj1 is not a gun, the derived rule is false! Training instance. Previous realizations of EBG have used the term 'training instance' rather than our 'training theory.' While the literature makes the same operational distinction of excluding clauses of the training instance from generalized proofs, the term 'training instance' additionally carries the connotation of embodying a single example situation from which the learner should generalize. We have taken the liberty of renaming 3 to avoid that connotation.
Typically within logic programming implementations of EBG, atomic clauses are directly recognized as belonging to the training instance (Kedar-Cabelli & McCarty, 1987; Hirsh, 1987; Prieditis & Mostow, 1987 )-e.g., gun obj1. Although this notion of training instance offers some intuitive value, we find it artificially restrictive. There exist atomic clauses that we might want to include within 3D, such as !! adjacent XX. 3 The same is true even for constant atomic clauses: for example, to represent that block1 is glued to the table we could assert D on block1 table. Alternatively, we might want to include variables and logical connectives within 3-clauses: for example, under the temporary condition that all blocks are stacked in two-high pairs, we might assert the rules clear X <= on X Y and on Y table <= on X Y. D furthermore affords the potential to intermix knowledge of the domain and training theory through the nesting of D below the top-level. Our use of D, then, avoids what we believe to be undue limitations on the training instance; our training theory may instead contain arbitrary XProlog clauses. Besides providing greater expressiveness, a modal logic representation for the distinction between D and 3 can be given a clear semantics that is independent of a particular search procedure or generalization algorithm.
Modal logic and EBG. Admittedly, the analogy that contingency is to necessity as training theory is to domain theory is philosophically questionable. The basis for our incorporation of D is rather that the operator elegantly models the difference between 3 and D in a formal (as opposed to an operational) manner-that is, through a formal language and the accompanying proof system. Our use of the terms 'contingency' and 'necessity' is meant to convey some semantic intuition about why D models this distinction. One could easily turn this observation around and say that we have found yet another interpretation of D.4
Operationality. We illustrated in §3 how D defined which proof steps are included in generalized proofs. Within the EBG paradigm, the traditional means of restricting the extent of generalized proofs is through operationality criteria: by establishing that a particular goal meets an operationality criterion the subtree deriving it is 'pruned' from the generalized proof. That is, an operationality criterion can be viewed as a predicate that determines whether a given goal should be a leaf of the generalized proof. The term 'operational' arises from the constraint that such subgoals be efficiently derivable at the time of rule application. To illustrate, if we augment the original formulation of the suicide example ( §3) with a declaration that the goal weapon Z is operational, the EBG algorithm produces the derived rule !! kill XX <= depressed X, buy X C, weapon C.
as the derivation of weapon Z is excluded from the generalized proof. 5, 6 Although D and operationality criteria are both mechanisms that limit the extent of generalized proofs, the former is a property of clauses (i.e., whether or not they contain D), while the latter is a property of goals (i.e., whether or not they are operational). Operationality criteria present the same trade-off we have seen for D: the closer the operational subgoals are to the root of the generalized proof, the more generally applicable the derived rule is, but also the more work is required to apply it.
Before continuing our development of EBG, operationality, and D, we must further discuss higher-order language in general, and XProlog in particular.
XProlog-A higher-order logic programming language
XProlog (Nadathur & Miller, 1988) extends traditional logic programming languages primarily
• by providing the simply-typed X-calculus as a data-type; that is, XProlog terms are simplytyped X-terms.
• by incorporating the higher-order unification required for A-terms.
• by including more expressive logic contructs-e.g., embedded implication and quantification.
• by admitting higher-order predicates in a principled manner.
Within this section we briefly introduce XProlog. While this work relies upon and extends XProlog, the language is itself a research prototype.
Higher-order language. We follow common practice in overloading the term 'higher-order' by applying it to values and domains (semantic entities), as well as to languages (syntactic entities). A domain is said to be higher-order if it contains higher-order values-that is, values which take other values as arguments (e.g., functions and predicates). For instance, the values manipulated by a higher-order programming language include functions. (By 'manipulated' we mean that functions are 'first-class' objects-i.e., they can be bound to variables, passed as parameters, and returned from function calls.) Similarly, within a higherorder logic, the values that can be quantified include functions and predicates.
On the other hand, we consider a representation language to be higher-order if it contains a means for expressing argument binding: for example, the X of X-calculus or lambda in LISP. Such languages are particularly amenable to representing the values of higherorder domains, since the formation of higher-order objects can be expressed with X.
X-terms.
Terms of the simply-typed X-calculus take the form where M and N range over, terms, c ranges over constants, x over variables, and T over simple types. A given \-abstraction Xx:t.M is of function type T -> t' provided M has type T '. The juxtaposition MN denotes a X-term application, which is of type T ' provided M is of type T -> T ' and N is of type r. X-term application associates to the left: a b c is read as (a b) c. Thus the Prolog term p(a, b) is written as p a b in XProlog.
X-terms become exceedingly redundant if all of the types required by the syntactic definition are explicitly included. A more succinct representation is afforded by eliding unnecessary type information. Type reconstruction is the process of rederiving those omitted types. In practice, all types are omitted from XProlog terms. The types of constants are instead specified by explicit declaration, and the types of variables, untyped constants, abstractions, and applications are then inferred from context. In the sequel, we will omit types with the understanding that they are to be subsequently derived through type reconstruction.
Basic operations on X-terms. We use the notation [N/x]M to denote the substitution of N for free occurrences of x in M. (Bound variables may have to be renamed to avoid capture; see the example below.) The term operations supported by XProlog include 0-and n-reduction as well as a-conversion, which are defined as follows: provided x not free in M provided y not free in M Closures over these operations yield corresponding notions of X-term convertibility: M is said to be b-convertible to M' if there exists a sequence of 3-reductions and 3-expansions (the inverse), applied at the top-level or to subterms, transforming M to M'. In this calculus, Jn-reductions are normalizing and Church-Rosser (Hindley & Seldin, 1986) ; that is, maximal sequences of such reductions terminate with a unique X-term said to be in 3n-normal form. This property is a consequence of the typing given to X-terms, and is crucial for the unification algorithm, since the convertibility of two terms can be tested by comparing their normal forms for equivalence modulo the renaming of bound variables (a-conversion).
Higher-order unification. Unification is the process of producing a common instance from two or more terms by instantiating either term's free variables with other terms. 7 We use the XProlog notation M = N to indicate that the X-terms M and N are to be unified. When unifying terms, we are typically interested in the most general unifier (MGU); for example, the MGU of px and py is simply (x = y), rather than the overly specific (x = a, y = a).
Unification underlies the logic programming paradigm, but because XProlog terms are X-terms, XProlog unification must be higher-order-i.e., it must support the instantiation of variables to functions as well as to first-order constants. X-terms, however, do not admit unique most general unifiers: consider that the unification of Fa = caa allows the variable F to be instantiated with any of Ax.caa, Xx.cxa, Xx.cax, or Xx.cxx, none of which is an instance of another (they are all closed). Thus, higher-order unification is inherently nondeterministic. Even worse, Goldfarb shows that higher-order (and in particular, secondorder) unification is undecidable (Goldferb, 1981) . However, a semi-decision procedure effective in practice is presented by Huet, (1975) and refined by Elliott (1990) .
Using higher-order language. Within a higher-order language, binding operators are implemented via the primitive X. For example, the function f(x) = 2*x might be represented simply as f= Xx.2 * x. Similarly, Vx3y.x < y might be expressed using the logical product II and sum £ as II Xx. E Xy. x < y. (In fact, this is the representation used within XProlog; the former is simply a more readable abbreviation.) The implementation of other binding operators in terms of X allows a/3»;-conversion and X-term unification to be implemented once within the representation language rather than within individual client programs (Pfenning & Elliott, 1988; Harper, Honsell & Plotkin, 1987) . Relegating such tasks to the representation language makes for more succint, elegant programs.
Many domains naturally involve binding constructs, and are thus best represented within higher-order languages: logics, programming languages, and natural languages (Pfenning & Elliott, 1988; Miller & Nadathur, 1987; Miller & Nadathur, 1986; Pereira, 1991) . This same need for higher-order representation also arises when one wants to reason 'at the meta-level-that is, about aspects of XProlog. One would like facts (propositions) or properties (predicates) to be objects themselves. Prolog and other first-order representation languages allow this to some extent, but in a way that is only operationally, but not logically motivated. XProlog, on the other hand, facilitates higher-order programming-that is, the ability to create goals and programs, and pass them as arguments.
First-vs. higher-order. When higher-order values are represented within first-order languages, we often need 'new variables,' need to check conditions such as 'where x does not occur in M', or must implement substitution in a way that 'renames bound variables if necessary.' Additionally, procedures that depend upon the binding operator-e.g., 01817-conversion and higher-order unification-must be explicitly programmed. All this makes for a prohibitively complex encoding.
The extent of the overhead incurred through these higher-order operations remains unclear. On the one hand, direct implementation of a/fy-conversion and higher-order unification is generally more efficient than user-programmed encodings, since an extra layer of language is avoided. On the other hand, the full power of higher-order unification is potentially too costly. Yet Huet's semi-decision procedure is effective in practice, simply because typical applications of X-term unification are more restricted than the worst case.
A subset of XProlog named Lx is currently being developed by Miller (1990) . Lx restricts higher-order unification to maintain the attractive properties of first-order unification, namely decidability and most general unifiers. The overhead of Lx's restricted higher-order unification is not significantly different than that of first-order. A discussion of the relevance of LX to this work is beyond the scope of the paper.
XProlog clauses and goals. Simply-typed X-terms and higher-order unification underlie XProlog; now we turn to the logical connectives of the language. XProlog terms are distinguished based upon whether they appear as a goal G or a program clause D. The above classes define the core of XProlog-the higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas (Nadathur & Miller, 1988) , which generalize Horn clauses while preserving the basic character of a logic programming language. Clauses are restricted in that they may not contain disjunction (;) or existential quantification (3), because of the difficulty in giving an operational interpretation to such D-forms.
An example XProlog program. We herein consider the programming of a higher-order predicate select, such that select P K L insures that L is a sublist of K for which P holds. The type of select is
select may be programmed as
(:: adds an element to the head of a list.) The following query, for example, selects grandparents from the given input list:
?-select (\x.3y. (parent y x, 3z.parent z y)) (tom :: kate :: leo :: nil) L.
Readers may argue that select could be formulated within Prolog simply by replacing P x with apply P x, and further, that grandparent could itself be encoded as a top-level Prolog predicate:
In many situations, however, the 'inline' expression of higher-order arguments (such as the unnamed grandparent) is either necessary or desirable: for instance, reformulation at the top-level is not applicable to higher-order functions that are not predicates (i.e., not of type 0). Moreover, first-order languages do not permit many operations over predicates, such as composition: consider
(where the operator ';' represents inclusive 'or'.) Within Prolog, select_or cannot be programmed in terms of select, at least not without revising select's original definition.
Higher-order EBG
In §4 we made the case for the additional expressiveness afforded by higher-order language, and in particular for XProlog. Expressive elegance is intimately tied to effective generalization: succinct and elegant rules make for succinct and elegant generalizations.
We would like to assert more, namely that first-order encodings are inadequate for the task of generalization within higher-order domains, because primitive syntactic manipulations inevitably intrude into the generalizations. To justify this claimed inadequacy, one might attempt to formalize a given higher-order example within a first-order language. However, at best such a strategy could only establish the inadequacy of one particular formulation. Arguing that first-order encodings are generally insufficient for higher-order domains and higher-order generalization is more problematic, because first-order languages certainly are expressively (and computationally) adequate.
Instead, we suggest the proper question is whether programmers should be unduly constrained in their choice of language. Higher-order representation languages are higher-level in that their additional expressiveness eases the task of programming over higher-order domains: witness the success of higher-order programming languages such as ML, LISP, Scheme, and more recently (and to a lesser degree) XProlog. As we can expect programmers to continue to make use of higher-order languages, the successful application of EBG to these domains necessitates that the paradigm be extended to higher-order generalization.
We illustrate higher-order EBG within the domain of symbolic integration. Consider the following higher-order rules: the first treats exponentiation, the second extracts a constant factor, and the third splits a sum. (The predicate intgr relates a function to its indefinite integral. We use a mathematical notation for arithmetic operators not included in XProlog-in particular, exponentiation and division-as it increases readability.)
The traditional binding notation of dx has been replaced with X-terms. Missing from the first rule is the restriction that a = -1, because XProlog does not admit constraints other than those imposed by unification. 8 The integration rule for cosine is an example of a 3-clause that is not 'contingent': while the rule is valid in the same sense as the others, it represents a proof step we wish to abstract under EBG.
The query ?-intgr (Xx.3 * x 2 + cos x) H.
yields the solution and the generalization
The proof and generalized proof associated with this example are given in Figures 5 and  6 , respectively.
9
The generalization space of higher-order EBG is significantly larger than that of firstorder in that higher-order constants are additionally subject to variable replacement: consider that in the first-order case of Figure 2 , the goal kill X Y is fully general, while for higher-order, a single variable G ranging over goals is fully general. Also unlike the proofs of §2 & 3, the integration proofs make use of higher-order unification, which implicitly enforces the restrictions placed upon free and bound variables: for example, within an application of the power rule, \x.x a will not unify with \x.x x since a may not contain free occurrences of x. 10 Moreover, function variables may then appear in the derived generalizations (e.g., F). While this application is limited to abstracting X-terms, X D Prolog supports generalization over predicates as well.
Search control via tactics
The previous integration example relied upon logic programming's implicit search to solve queries. Additional levels of search control need not, however, interfere with the underlying process of EBG! We demonstrate this by implementing a tactic-based approach to the symbolic integration problem. Search is controlled within a tactic-based theorem prover (or problem solver) by requiring the user to a priori or interactively specify a combination of proof steps, or tactics, with which to attempt the derivation of a goal (Gordon, Milner & Wadsworth, 1979; Constable, et al. 1986 ). These tactics guide the construction of an actual proof (or problem solution).11
Tactics are simply named rules: for the integration domain, we have
(intgr F F'). tac cos_tac (intgr cos sin) true.
Tactics perform goal reduction: the input goal Gin (2nd argument) is reduced to a more easily solved subgoal Gout (3rd argument).
To represent compositions of tactics, we have problem independent meta-tactics, or tacticals, such as
!! tac idtac
Gin Gin. !! tac (then T1 T2) Gin Gout = tac T1, Gin Gmed, tac T2 Gmed Gout. !! tac (orelse T1 T2) Gin Gout -tac T1 Gin Gout; tac T2 Gin Gout.
!! tac (repeat T) Gin Gout = tac (orelse (then T (repeat T)) idtac) Gin Gout.
We augment the above with a special interactive tactical: !! tac interactive Gin Gout = write_string "Goal to be reduced: ", write Gin, newline, write_string '' Enter tact i c/tact i ca l : ", read XT. tac T Gin Gmed, ((Gmed = true, Gout = true) ; tac interactive Gmed Gout).
(XProlog's input predicate read, which is of type (A -0) -0, differs from Prolog's in that the entered term is bound to the variable T before execution of read's body.) Now to solve the query ?-tac interactive (intgr (\x.2 * (3 * cos x)) H) Gout.
we could enter the series of tactics constant-left, constant_left, and cos_tac as prompted; or equally, the tactical (then (repeat contant_left) cos_tac), yielding as well as the generalization
Level of generalization. Since tactics of the training theory are abstracted, the above generalization is applicable to problems not addressed by the original tactical: for example, Xx.2 * (3 * sin x). At the same time, this derived rule does not cover the range of problems for which the tactical (then (repeat constant_left) cos__tac) is applicable: consider intgr (Xx*.3 * cos x) H. This is because the tactical-or meta-level is formulated completely within D, and hence generalization does not occur at that level; instead generalization is confined to the tactic-or rule-level. This is, of course, exactly what we were after when we set out to make the additional level of search control transparent to EBG. Alternative formulations could produce generalizations at the tactical-level, but those derived rules are more likely to be so general that they would be difficult to apply.
Level of assimilation. Within this paper, we have concentrated on how a rich representation language supports EBG, and have ignored questions concerning how these generalizations may be assimilated and applied automatically. Under the traditional approach, the underlying architecture of the problem solver produces and assimilates generalizations in the course of solving each query (at least when learning is 'switched on'). This assimilation may be selective or may involve the forgetting of those derived rules only infrequently referenced.
12
This approach to assimilation is, however, problematic for tactic-based paradigms. In the above example, although generalization occurs only at the level of tactics, the derived rule nevertheless contains a reference to the tactical interactive. If we are to maintain a strict separation of the rule-level and meta-level, it does not make sense to assimilate a generalization encompassing both levels. Rather, a slightly modified generalization could be assimilated at the rule-level as a derived tactic:
The point is that it is the user (or client program), rather than the architecture, which is in a position to control assimilation. If we were to instead directly assimilate the original generalization, we compromise the predicate interactive in that a subsequent invocation might no longer prompt the user; that is, we compromise the user's control over search.
This example reinforces our belief that for such applications EBG should be a feature of the language in which problem solvers are coded, rather than a 'black box' within the problem solving architecture. In other words, what is required is a language in which one can program the learning mechanism. By providing the programmer with an explicit means to control generalization and assimilation, we defer the difficult problem of determining when to generalize and assimilate. Client programs have the potential advantage of bringing domain knowledge and user interaction to bear in determining what is to be learned. This concept of programming generalization and learning within the same language in which problem solving and interaction occur is markedly different from what we label 'blackbox' learning. Hence our approach stands in contrast to systems such as SOAR (Laird, Rosenbloom & Newell, 1987) , Prodigy (Minton, et al., 1989) , and LEAP (Mitchell, Mahadevan, & Steinberg, 1985) in which learning is largely relegated to the underlying architecture. (A thorough treatment of our approach to programmable generalization and assimilation is beyond the scope of this paper; see instead Dietzen (1991) .
Operationality vs. D. While §3 illustrated that both D and operationality criteria serve to define EBG's generalized proofs (and hence its results), the tactic example above demonstrates that the mechanisms are not equivalent: consider that a formulation of the integration domain that replaces D with operationality criteria (defined via the predicate oper) requires specifying
oper (tac interactive (intgr cos sin) true).
The problem is that this definition again forces the mixing of the rule-and meta-level, thereby violating the modularity of our encoding.
Operationality criteria, on the other hand, do provide features beyond the capabilities of D. For instance, they offer a generally more concise means to define generalized proofs: by declaring that only a single subgoal is operational, the entire branch of the generalized proof underneath is excluded, or 'pruned', from the generalization. Achieving the same effect with D alone would require removing each of the program clauses applied within that branch from D. Furthermore, if a particular rule is used pervasively in a proof, it might be necessary to include it within both 3D and 3 (and then use some form of additional control to discriminate between occurrences.) Operationality criteria do not present a corresponding problem, as it is unlikely that recurring subgoals could be considered both operational and non-operational. D does, however, offer the means to generalize in an entirely different manner: consider that even interior steps can be abstracted from generalized proofs via D.
We conclude that the mechanisms of operationality criteria and D are complementary, and while D is sufficient to formulate the examples presented within this paper, we do not suggest it as a replacement for operationality criteria. In fact, the combination of the two is particularly attractive: modal logic induces an underlying limit to the specialization of derived rules that potentially prohibits EBG from yielding 'incorrect' generalizations, while operationality criteria provide a means to 'fine tune' selection from the space of possible generalizations admitted by D.
Program transformation and apprentice learning
One paradigm for formal program development is that of program transformation (Burstall & Darlington, 1977; Huet & Lang, 1978; Feather, 1986; Partsch & Steinbruggen, 1983) . Under a transformational approach, an abstract specification of an algorithm is refined, or specialized, through a sequence of formal elaboration steps, or transformations, into a program with acceptable performance. The resulting sequence of transformations along with the initial specification serve as a derivation, or justification, of the optimized program. 13, 14 We illustrate EBG over a transformational system which we have applied to induce tail recursion in certain situations (Dietzen & Scherlis, 1987) . (From a tail recursive version, an iterative form could easily be derived.) As an understanding of the derivation's details is unnecessary for this discussion, we defer presentation of the full derivation to Appendix A.
We begin with a functional specification of the factorial program:
The above is a XProlog abstract syntax for a simple functional language. The constructs lam and appl represent object-level X-abstraction and application, respectively. The fixpoint or recursion operator fix is 'applied' by substituting its body for each occurrence of the bound identifier within its body (see Appendix A).
The derivation proceeds by applying transformations to this specification. For example, the following transformation replaces an occurrence of e with op e z, where z is a right identity of op (for example, mapping a to a + 0):
!! add_id_right op C (C e) (C (op e z)) = right_identity op z .
The third and fourth arguments match the input and output object programs, respectively. The second argument C specifies a context-i.e., the particular subexpression of the input program to be transformed. These higher-order context variables serve to formally encode subterm or occurrence selection, which might, for example, result from "pointing with a mouse" (Pfenning & Elliott, 1988) . (This constitutes yet another application of higherorder representation language: the formal expression of occurrences.) For example, within the following invocation of the transformation ?-add_id_right (hx.Xy.x + y) (\g.g * h) (a * b) F outI .
the context variable C is \g.g * h. From the definition of add_id_right above, C is applied to e and then matched against the input a * b; that is, Thus, e is instantiated to a and h to b. Now, given that right_identity (Xx.Xy.x + y) 0 the output F out is instantiated as follows:
The full derivation tail_rec, which consists of a sequence of ten such transformation rules and the associated contexts, constitutes a meta-program-i.e., a program that manipulates an object program such as fact. This meta-program would ideally be constructed interactively by alternatively selecting rules and contexts; as eLP currently lacks the interface necessary to interpret 'mouse input', tail_rec was instead hand-coded. The meta-program is applied to fact through the query ?-tail_rec (\x.\y.x * y) (fix \fact. lam Xn. if (equals n 0) 1 (appl fact (n -1)) *n)
which yields the tail recursive expression
But more interesting is the generalization: The result produced by our prototype is not so elegantly expressed: it consists instead of a series of constraint equations. We took the liberty of collapsing them into their 'most obvious' solution above for presentation. The problem of more elegantly displaying these constraints requires further consideration. In either form, however, the generalization may be applied to analogous programs such as list reversal: 
(tl l))) nil
The above result requires only the addition of a final simplification to make the reduction from (append ((hd l):: nil) k) to ((hd l):: k). Hence, the generalized fact derivation is sufficient for rev as well (except for final simplification).
The elegance of the above generalization is largely due to the expressiveness of higherorder language. In particular, essential restrictions on the input program are implicit in the higher-order notation: (1) that the function argument y may not appear in the 'then' part of the if-statement, (2) that the function/may not be recursively invoked in the 'conditional' or 'then' parts of the if, and (3) that the recursive call to f within the 'else' branch must be the argument to a particular function op having special properties. These restrictions are not explicit in any single transformation step, but rather are spread over the sequence of transformations embodied by the generalization. Realizing a similar result within a first-order system would be substantially complicated by, for example, the need for these explicit occurrence checks.
Apprentice learning. We believe that the search space for the above derivation is intractable; that is, without user guidance (e.g., via an explicit meta-program), it would not be feasible for a system to 'discover' the sequence of transformations and the associated contexts with which to induce tail recursion. The problem space of program transformation is further complicated in that it is the user who decides when a derived program is acceptably 'efficient-in this case, when it is tail-recursive. For transformation systems, we are not in the situation of theorem proving where there are only two answers-'yes, a goal is provable" or "no, it is not." Instead, the role of the user is two-fold: to guide the derivation and to make value judgments upon the resulting programs. Currently we are so far from automating the latter that transformation systems will continue to depend upon user assistance.
The fact that these value judgments are not part of the transformations means they are not manifest in the resulting generalizations. There is an important underlying assumption here: a sequence of transformations that leads to a 'good' program in one particular case (e.g., fact) is presumed to do the same for other programs to which it is applicable (e.g., rev). However, as this 'goodness' exists outside of the transformation system, there is no guarantee that a derived rule indeed yields a 'good' program. 16 Explanation-based generalization is often labeled 'speed-up' learning in that EBG extends the domain theory by constructing new rules in the deductive closure of that domain theory. In other words, under EBG nothing new may be proven, but the solution of problems covered by derived rules is (hopefully) quicker. With the incorporation of user interaction to address the problem of intractable search, this characterization of EBG becomes incorrect: the resulting generalizations, while in the deductive closure of the rule set, are generally not accessible without user guidance. Here EBG becomes a vehicle to transfer knowledge from the user to the learner. The combination of learner and user, when viewed as a whole, still only accomplishes speed-up learning. But, after a joint derivation of fact, the learner could handle rev without user assistance (presuming that the system could find the final simplification). That is, from the individual perspectives of the learner and user, more than speed-up learning has taken place (DeJong & Mooney, 1986; Dietterich, 1986, pp. 304-305; Mitchell, Mahadevan, & Steinberg, 1985; Mahadevan 1990 ).
XDProlog and EBG
Within this section we more formally describe XQProlog and higher-order EBG through a pair of interpreters written in XProlog.
The syntax of \DProlog is summarized by the following inductively defined classes:
where the new meta-variable Gn over ranges over 'boxed' goals, e is the null terminal, and P ranges over logic programs (omitting type definitions, module declarations, etc.) Although our examples have only employed D at the top level, the operator is not restricted to outermost occurrences. The use of D does not, however, extend to arbitrary XProlog constructs. In particular, XDProlog disallows goals of the form D(D = G), D(3x.G), and D(G1 ; G2), because it is unclear how to give them an operational definition. It is also unclear what additional expressiveness would be provided.
XDProlog does not distinguish sequences of the modal prefix; that is, DOA is equivalent to DA. In this respect XDProlog may be considered an intuitionistic version of the classical modal logic S5 (Chellas, 1980) . However, XDProlog is a proper subset of 55 as it lacks negation (-) and the second modal operator of possibility 0, which may be defined as -n -. The difference between possible and contingent truth is conceptually similar to that between contingency and necessity: OA is to A as A is to OA. XDProlog could equally have been formulated with unprefixed clauses representing domain theory and clauses prefixed with 0 standing for training theory. This meta-interpreter is extended to perform EBG within a second prototype in §8.2. The expanded meta-interpreter exemplifies the generalization algorithm admitted by X D Prolog, and has produced the examples contained within this paper. In §8.3 we augment this meta-interpreter to admit operationality criteria.
To run examples using the meta-interpreters to follow, the X^Prolog program P ob to be interpreted must be available as data. This is accomplished by asserting hyp D for each clause D of P ob prior to invoking the meta-interpreter. The prototype may then enumerate P ob with XProlog's backtracking search (by successively solving the goal hyp D).
17
Variables of clauses asserted with hyp must be explicitly universally quantified. (The '!!' convention, while part of the eventual system, is not realizable within the prototype.) What follows is a portion of the ubiquitous suicide example in the form recognized by the meta-interpreter:
hyp (D VA VB VC. kill A B = hate A B, possess A C, weapon C). hyp (gun obj1).
The meta-interpreter
The X D Prolog interpreter is divided between two sets of clauses: the solve predicates of Figure 7 , which reduce a given X D Prolog goal G to some number of atomic subgoals (G a 's), and the match predicates of Figure 8 , which attempt to solve a pending atomic subgoal G a . The goal reduction performed by solve is again split between two sets of clauses: wsolve for 'weak-solve' and ssolve for 'strong-solve.' This distinction arises from the more stringent proof required by the necessary truth of 'boxed' goals: for example, from the clause p we cannot derive the goal D p, but the goal p does follow from the clause D p. The top-level predicate is wsolve, because goals are contingent until a D has been encountered. Each of the G a 's derived through solve will require either a 'strong' or 'weak' proof, which is realized through the corresponding match predicates-wmatch and smatch.
Within In the final clauses of wsolve and ssolve, the pending goal has been reduced to an atomic G a . This is insured by our use of the cut operator '!' of logic programming: if G a instead contained a logical connective, '!' would have committed the interpretation to one of the preceding clauses. 18 Through the predicate hyp, the final clauses of wsolve and ssolve select a potentially pertinent clause D from the program, which the match predicates then attempt to apply in the proof of G a . The selection of D is 'naive' in that each clause of (P 0b is simply tried in order until one is found that derives G a . As we shall see, in the course of deriving G a from D, match may produce subgoals (G s 19 which may become instantiated in the course of the proof: for example, the clause II Xz.weapon z = gun z becomes weapon Y = gun Y. If D is a rule D' = G', we conjoin G' with the subgoals that arise from establishing that D' implies G a : for the clause weapon Y = gun Y, the interpreter first determines whether weapon Y establishes G a , and then attempts to solve gun Y. When smatch encounters a D in the program, the nested clause need only be weakly matched with the current goal. This is because proving a goal 'strongly' simply requires that any utilized clauses must themselves be necessarily true. The resulting subgoal G s is, however, boxed as it too must be strongly proved. On the other hand, wmatch ignores D's within D, because we are therein only concerned with a weak proof.
In the final clause of wmatch, the unification of an atomic D a and G a is attempted: for example, unifying the goal weapon objl with the clause weapon Y. This is analogous to the unification of a goal and clause head under a Prolog interpretation. If successful, this has the effect of 'returning' the accumulated conjunction of subgoals G 8 (in this case, gun objl) to the last clause of solve, which will then derive G s recursively. The predicate smatch is, however, missing the analogue to the last clause of wmatch. This is because a contingent atomic clause cannot be used to prove a necessary atomic goal; that is, the clause p is not sufficient to derive D p.
This concludes the discussion of the basic X D Prolog meta-interpreter. The next step is extending it to perform EBG.
The generalizing meta-interpreter
Kedar-Cabelli & McCarty produce first-order explanation-based generalizations within Prolog via an augmented meta-interpreter (Kedar-Cabelli & McCarty, 1987) . As we shall take a similar approach, we briefly review Kedar-Cabelli & McCarty's implementation: Under its second formulation (pp. 387-388), their meta-interpreter, prolog_ebg, solves a particular query in parallel with the construction of the associated explanation-based generalization. The predicate prolog_ebg takes three arguments: the particular query G, the generalized query GG, and the conjunction of generalized conditions DD sufficient to derive GG. Each 'rule' applied by prolog_ebg in the proof of G is similarly applied in the proof of GG. Leaves of the Prolog computation that arise in the course of deriving GG (i.e., those goals established by 'facts') are accumulated in the conjunction of sufficient conditions DD. The resulting explanation-based generalization is then GG = DD, where for example
No explicit representation of the proof need be constructed; it is inherent in the Prolog search.
As in the first-order approach of Kedar-Cabelli and McCarty (1987) , our generalizing meta-interpreter develops two parallel proofs simultaneously: a proof of G and a generalized proof of GG. Again these proofs are not explicitly constructed; rather they are implicit in the XProlog search. In the course of deriving G and GG, the implementation accumulates the conjunction of generalized clauses DD sufficient to establish GG-that is, the leaves of the generalized proof. The resulting explanation-based generalization is then !! GG = DD. In the extended wsolve and ssolve of Figure 9 , the decomposition of G guides the corresponding instantiation of the generalized goal GG. It is only at the atomic level where G and GG diverge. (An exception is made for the handling of implicational goals D' = G', which is simplified by locally treating D' as a part of P ob .) The MG's (for 'metasubgoaT) in the final clauses of solve assume a role analogous to that played by subgoals in the previous meta-interpreter-that is, MG's retain subproof tasks for later derivation. The transition from the G s 's of the first interpreter to the current MG's comes out of the need to maintain both G and GG for subsequent solution. The straight-forward clauses meta_wsolve and meta_ssolve that derive MG's are given within Figure 11 .
After solve selects a clause D with which to derive G a , the extended match predicates of Figure 10 attempt to apply D is the solution of G a . But in the course of deriving G a , the new match also yields a generalized atomic goal GG a and a generalized clause DD sufficient to derive GG a . Within the final clause of wmatch where D a is unified with G a , DD is instead unified with GG a . That neither the pair G a and GG a nor the pair D a and DD are unified is essential for generalization: DD and GG need only be instantiated to the point that GG necessarily follows from DD.
How then do any of the constants of D (first or higher-order) ever end up in GG or DD? The answer is that unless some of the D's employed in the proof are boxed, none ever will. In the matching of boxed clauses, D and DD are explicitly unified in the invocation of bmatch (for 'boxed-match'): within the suicide problem, for example, both D and DD are bound to VZ.weapon Z = gun Z. (The additional predicate bmatch is required to handle subtle differences in the matching of instantiated DD's.) While D and DD are initially equivalent within bmatch, they may later diverge as distinct new logical variables X and Y are substituted for universally quantified programs. This is because D is to be unified with G a , while DD is to be unified with GG a : again for the weapon clause, D's logical variable becomes bound to objl, while that of DD remains uninstantiated.
As both boxed and unboxed clauses are used in the proofs we have developed, the reader might rightfully expect both to appear in DD, the resulting sufficient conditions of the generalization. However, boxed clauses are 'necessarily' true, and hence need not be rechecked during the application of a derived rule. Instead, it is the conjunction of utilized unboxed clauses which constitutes the simplest expression of the sufficient conditions for GG. Removing boxed clauses from DD requires a simple reduction predicate reduce, which replaces arbitrary occurrences of D P by true within DD. (As reduce is relatively trivial, we omit its definition; instead see Dietzen (1991) .) Explanation-based generalizations may then be derived as follows:
do_ebg G (GG = DD') = wsolve G GG DD, reduce DD DD'.
Operationality
Incorporating operationality criteria within the preceding prototype requires providing the meta-interpreter with access to an operationality predicate oper. The revision involves inserting the following clause at the head of the solve predicates. We illustrate the change for wsolve; an analogous change is necessary in ssolve:
where wsolve__orig is the version of wsolve that does not perform EBG-i.e., that given within Figure 7 . 20 The computation proceeds in the same manner, but EBG is suspended during the solution of operational subgoals. Instead, DD is bound to the current generalized goal GG, which, because it is operational, becomes one of the sufficient conditions of the resulting generalization. The above clause is expected to be used for recursive invocations of solve-i.e., during the solution of subgoals; if a top-level goal is made operational, the resulting explanation-based generalization is trivial.
It is the user's responsibility to specify the computation necessary to determine oper of particular goals. Should no clauses be provided for oper, the above implementation behaves in the same manner as the original. Moreover, this formulation of operationality is dynamic, in that oper may be defined and redefined within the course of the computation (Hirsh, 1988 ). 
Direct implementation
The above X D Prolog implementation in XProlog has been extremely valuable for experimenting with different variations of X D Prolog and the EBG algorithm, and further for providing a formal specification of each. It is, however, extremely slow due to the additional level of interpretation, which also precludes the application of XProlog optimizations (such as hashing rules based upon predicate names). Furthermore, the meta-interpreter is not powerful enough to handle XProlog primitives (e.g., cut or arithmetic), or to realize the !! convention, 22 or to implement primitives for controlling EBG as well as those for manipulating and assimilating rules derived through EBG. (Again, a discussion may be found in Dietzen (1991) .) We have addressed the above deficiencies by extending our existing XProlog interpreter, eLP, to realize X D Prolog and EBG.
Conclusion
To date, the application of the machine learning technique of explanation-based generalization has largely been limited to first-order representation languages. Such encodings do not lend themselves to the natural and concise expression and manipulation of higher-order objects such as functions and predicates. To facilitate generalization over these higher-order values, we have expanded the paradigm to higher-order explanation-based generalization, and further have provided a formal characterization of higher-order EBG through the higherorder logic programming language XProlog and concepts of modal logic. Potential applications include learning systems that manipulate programs, logical formulas, mathematical expressions, and natural language. Our presentation herein has focused upon the formulation and illustration of higher-order EBG within the framework of X n Prolog. In order to derive and exploit these generalizations, there must be mechanisms for initiating EBG within X D Prolog (in our view, under the programmer's direction), and also for extending the existing logic program with newly derived clauses. The latter consideration is problematic in that the standard construct by which Prolog programs are extended, assert, is not semantically well-behaved. For this and other reasons, assert is not part of XProlog. Elsewhere, we propose new constructs, rule and rule_ebg, that provide for programmable generalization and assimilation ( §6), and that offer a straightforward semantics reconcilable with XProlog (Dietzen, 1991) .
Broadly speaking, then, our work should be viewed as a language design effort. This distinction is fundamentally important to the evaluation of our efforts. Unlike typical 'stand alone' learning systems, X a Prolog does not pose its own learning problems. Instead, by integrating learning mechanisms within the programming language, we defer one of the most difficult problems faced by a 'learner': determining over what computations to attempt learning, or in other words, determining when to learn. While X n Prolog is not itself a learning system, it is intended to serve as a high-level foundation for the implementation of such systems.
Many questions remain, but perhaps the predominant one is whether a relatively complete, higher-order learning system can be effectively realized within X D Prolog. While we have provided example scenarios-both of EBG's direct use to reduce XProlog search, and of its role within an apprentice learner to encapsulate the results of interactive problem solving-we have not yet produced such a system. This is largely due to limitations of our present implementation, both in performance and in functionality (e.g., its lack of a mouse interface) (Dietzen, 1991) . Also of particular interest to the authors is the further development of the 'language-based' approach to learning (of which X D Prolog is an exemplar) to encompass other EBG methodologies (e.g., generalizing iterative and recursive theories, (Cohen, 1988; Shavlik, 1990) ) and other paradigms of generalization (e.g., similarity-based methods, (Hirsh, 1989) ).
The only difference is the values of the arguments m and n. This means that we may fold the above expression into a fact l invocation. appl (fix \fact l . lam \m. lam \n. if equals n 0 m (appl (applfact 1 (n * m)) (n -1))) 1 This completes the derivation.
